We present a general model for the Prisoner's Dilemma in which variable degrees of cooperation are possible, and payo!s are scaled accordingly. We describe a continuous strategy space, and divide this space into strategy families. We derive the payo! function for these families analytically, and study the evolutionary outcome when a wide range of strategies play against each other. Our results show that the initial degree of cooperation o!ered by a strategy is a decisive factor for evolutionary robustness: the most successful strategies in our model o!er full cooperation as an initial move, but thereafter cooperate fully only if their opponent does the same. These strategies gradually raise the stakes when playing a strategy which is initially reticent to cooperate, but di!er from the strategies predicted by other continuous models in that they are not only generous, but are also consistently optimistic and uncompromising.
Introduction
In spite of the "erce competition inherent to natural selection, reciprocal altruism plays a fundamental role in both human and animal behaviour (Hamilton, 1963 (Hamilton, , 1964 Trivers, 1971; Packer, 1977; Wilkinson, 1984; Axelrod, 1984; Milinski, 1987; Milinski et al., 1990; Bull & Rice, 1991; Krebs & Davies, 1991; KuK lling & Milinski, 1992; Frank, 1995; Dugatkin & Mesterton-Gibbons, 1996; Dugatkin, 1997) . The evolution of stable patterns of mutually bene"cial interaction, particularly among sel"sh, unrelated individuals, appears paradoxical because such behaviour is so clearly vulnerable to exploitation. The Prisoner's Dilemma (Rapoport & Chammah, 1965; Trivers, 1971; Smale, 1980; Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981) is the mathematical framework for the study of cooperation, and had led to a large number of theoretical investigations (Selten & Hammerstein, 1984; Molander, 1985; Peck & Feldman, 1985; May, 1987; Boyd & Lorberbaum, 1987; Axelrod & Dion, 1988; Kraines & Kraines, 1989; Lindgren, 1991; Nowak & Sigmund, 1992 , 1993 Crowley, 1996; Crowley et al., 1996 ; but see Boyd, 1988; Dugatkin et al., 1992) . Cooperation can emerge because of repeated interactions between two individuals (direct reciprocity), indirect reciprocity (Alexander, 1987; Nowak & Sigmund, 1998) or spatial interactions (Nowak & May, 1992 ).
An implicit limitation of the traditional Prisoner's Dilemma is that interactions are discrete: each player can choose between only two options, cooperating or defecting. Recent papers have investigated the possibility of extending this classical game by allowing a variable degree of cooperation, with payo!s scaled accordingly (Verhoe!, 1993; Doebeli & Knowlton, 1998; Roberts & Sherratt, 1998; Killingback et al., 1999 ; see also Smale, 1980; Frean, 1996) . Modelling the Prisoner's Dilemma in the continuous spectrum has allowed these researchers to examine situations in which the current degree of cooperation depends either on previous payo!s (Doebeli & Knowlton, 1998) , or on a partner's previous move (Verhoe!, 1993; Roberts & Sherratt, 1998; Killingback et al., 1999) .
These models have been applied to such topics as interspeci"c mutualisms (Doebeli & Knowlton, 1998) or escalating investments (Roberts & Sherratt, 1998) , and the robustness of cooperation has been demonstrated in many contexts. The proposed models, however, di!er signi"cantly, as do the types of strategies that can be incorporated into each. We present here a general model for the Continuous Prisoner's Dilemma which describes a continuous threedimensional strategy space, and divide this space into strategy families that behave in qualitatively identical ways. We derive the payo! function for these families analytically, and determine regions of Nash equilibria in the strategy space. We also study the evolutionary outcome when a wide range of strategies play against each other, using a new approach which we call stochastic adaptive dynamics. In these simulations, strategies evolve by small mutations from previously successful strategies, and a stochastic element is used to capture the e!ects of random drift in populations at equilibrium.
We are particularly interested in the initial degree of cooperation o!ered by &&successful'' strategies. Our results show an extremely strong correlation between mean payo! and this initial o!er, for a wide range of strategies. We also "nd a set of essentially cooperative strategies which are Nash equilibria. These strategies gradually raise the stakes (Roberts & Sherratt, 1998) when playing a strategy which is initially reticent to cooperate, but di!er in other ways from the most successful strategies predicted by other continuous models (Verhoe!, 1993; Roberts & Sherratt, 1998; Doebeli & Knowlton, 1998) . The distinguishing feature of the successful strategies in this model is that they are not only generous, but also consistently optimistic and uncompromising, o!ering full cooperation as a "rst move but thereafter cooperating fully only if their opponent does the same.
The Continuous Prisoner:s Dilemma
We propose a general model of the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, in which both the costs and bene"ts of cooperation vary continuously. If player 1 moves x in a given round (where x is in the interval [0, 1]), the cost to player 1 is !cx, and the bene"t to player 2 is bx, with b'c. One &&round'' is complete after player 2 responds to this event by moving y in turn, entailing cost !cy to player 2 and bene"t by to player 1. Thus, in our model, playing 1 corresponds to complete cooperation, while playing 0 corresponds to complete defection. Obviously, this model could also be used to describe the simultaneous game, with responses y depending on opponents' moves in the previous round, but we restrict the description below to the alternating game (Frean, 1994; Nowak & Sigmund, 1994) . The model we describe is closely related to those proposed by Verhoe! (1993), Roberts and Sherratt (1998) and Killingback et al. (1999) .
We are interested in the set of all strategies, y"S(x), which de"ne the response y to an opponent's move x. Thus, S is a function on [0, 1] de"ned over the interval [0, 1] . When S is nonlinear, we "nd that chaotic sequences of moves could result; for example if y"4x(1!x) (the logistic equation, May 1976) plays against itself. We also note an extension of this model, in which any number of previous moves by an opponent could be taken into account:
, 2 ). For simplicity, we consider here only those strategies which vary linearly with x and with only one &&layer'' of x, the immediately previous move. Each strategy is then de"ned by a slope, k, an intercept, d, and a starting move x . Where kx#d'1 we set y"1, and likewise where kx#d(0, y"0. This subset of all S can be pictured as the set of straight lines which have a non-empty intersection with the unit square. We use the notation S IBV to describe a given strategy (abbreviated to S IB to describe a class of strategies which di!er only in x ). Clearly, the strategy S or y"1 corresponds to indiscriminate cooperation, while S or y"0 corresponds to indiscriminate defection, regardless of the opponent's previous move. For brevity, we denote these strategies AllC and AllD, respectively. The strategy S or y"x is analagous to Tit-for-Tat in the discrete case; this strategy lies on the line of identity and is denoted I.
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We de"ne a payo! function, F(S, S) which corresponds to the mean payo! per round that strategy S receives when playing against S. The payo! is clearly a function of the slopes, intercepts and starting moves of the two strategies, of the cost c and bene"t b, and of the total number of rounds in the game. In this paper, we discuss two treatments of the number of rounds: the case when the total number of rounds, n, is "xed; and the case when nN denotes the average number of rounds per game, such that the probability of a further move after each round of the game is given by (1!1/nN ).
Because the payo! will also depend on whether S or S moves "rst, we de"ne the payo! function as the average payo! between these two cases. As a limiting case, we sometimes consider the payo! of an in"nitely iterated game (payo! averaged over n rounds as nPR). For example, in the in"nite game F(AllC, AllC)"(b!c), and likewise F(AllD, AllD)"0. We also "nd that F(I, I)" (b!c), because the starting move for I is de"ned to be 1. For other strategies which lie on the identity line, the payo! when S V plays S VY will be equal to 1/2(b!c) (x #x ).
STRATEGY FAMILIES
We de"ne &&cooperative'' strategies as those which lie entirely on or above the line of identity, i.e. those strategies for which S(x)*x for all x. When two such strategies play against each other, each successive move is greater than the opponent's previous move, and after some "nite number of moves both players will cooperate fully. The mean payo! over an in"nite game between cooperative players is thus (b!c). For cooperators, k*0; the slope of the line is positive, and repeated rounds move the play closer to one.
The space of all possible strategies is a threedimensional polyhydron in k, d and x . We can subdivide this space based on the qualitative features of the strategies; in particular, we "nd that the most important factors are whether k is greater than zero, and which sides of the unit square the strategy intersects. This classi"cation on the plane of k and d is shown in Fig. 1 . Here, strategy families denoted P or N have positive or negative slopes, respectively. Repeated rounds of a game between two members of this strategy family move the play towards the value given by the superscript. For example, P is the set of all cooperators, as described above. In a game between any two players in the family P, the play will move towards either zero or one, depending on the starting move. For N, the play will move towards a repeated sequence of alternating zero and one. In the central region of the plane, denoted M, are those strategies which move the play towards some intermediate value between zero and one. Thus, if two strategies M IB and M IYBY play against each other, the moves played by strategy M IB will approach x"kx#d, while the moves played by M IYBY approach x" kx#d. Solving, we "nd x"(kd#d)/(1!kk) and x"k(kd#d)/(1!kk)#d (We will return to this interesting result in Section 3.2.).
In analogy with the cooperators, we de"ne &&defective'' strategies as those strategies which lie completely below the identity line, for which S(x)(x for all x. We see that after some "nite number of moves both players will play zero consistently, and that the mean payo! when two such strategies play each other will approach zero as nPR. The set of defectors is the family P in Fig. 1 . Indiscriminate cooperators, and indiscriminate defectors, lie along the boundaries of the regions above and below the unit square, respectively. Figure 2 shows the payo! function for each of these strategy families. We show here the payo! received in the limit when a strategy plays an in"nite game against itself, determined analytically. For those regions of the plane in which the payo! in the in"nite game depends on x , we plot the mean payo! for a mix of strategies with x uniformly distributed on [0, 1]. We have not been able to determine an analytical expression for the payo! between two arbitrary linear reactive strategies in either the "nitely or in"nitely iterated game.
THE ROBUSTNESS OF COOPERATION
We are interested in which cooperative strategies, P IBV can resist invasion by AllD, that is, under what conditions is For cooperative strategies, the response to an opponent's defection, y"S(0), is given by the intercept, d, and thus the payo! received by AllD when playing a given cooperator will depend on d, as well as on x and the number of rounds in the game.
For the in"nitely iterated game we "nd that
Thus in the limiting case of an in"nite game, cooperative strategies must have intercepts less than 1!c/b in order to resist invasion by AllD.
For the "nite game with exactly n moves, the payo! AllD receives when playing cooperator P IBV is given by (bx #(n!1)bd#nbd )/2n (when the cooperator moves "rst, AllD gets bx followed by n!1 rounds of bd; but when AllD moves "rst the payo! to AllD is n rounds of bd ). The payo! a cooperator receives when playing itself is the sum of a number of weighted costs and bene"ts as successive moves approach 1, followed by a number of terms in which the payo! is b!c (both players are cooperating fully), all divided by the total number of moves n. We can see that the upper limit on
This can be rewritten as a condition on x :
Since x must be greater than zero, this condition is always true when 2n
Thus, for the "nite game with n moves, a cooperator P IBV can be invaded by AllD if d is larger than (1!c/b) by a su$cient margin, and may be invaded by AllD if d is less than the same value but x is above the theshold given in eqn (4). . The surfaces show the steady-state values of x (x ' ) when both k and d are "xed. In these simulations, strategy S IBV played a single game against S IBVY where x "x # x, and b"5, c"1. We set x to 0.02 or !0.02 when x was initially set to 0 or 1, respectively. Games which were 20 rounds long on average (nN "20) were modelled by simulating 100 rounds and weighting the payo! in round i by the probability that a game would last to round i, (1!1/nN )G\. We note that xL "1 is robust for a signi"cant fraction of the strategy space, and in particular we "nd a region of strategy space in which x evolves towards one, regardless of its initial value.
ESTABLISHING COOPERATION
We are similarly interested in which cooperative strategies, P IBV , are able to invade a highly uncooperative population. In the in"nitely iterated game, F(AllD, AllD)"0 and F(P IBV , AllD)" !cd, therefore a single cooperative player can never invade a population of defectors. If, however, the frequency of cooperators in the total population is h, and the population is mixed between complete defectors and cooperators, then the growth rate of the cooperative strategies will exceed the growth of AllD when
which reduces to
We note that h can only be greater than this threshold if the right-hand side of inequality (7) is less than 1, which reduces to condition (2). This implies that cooperators can invade a population of defectors only if condition (2) is met and the starting frequency of the cooperators exceeds the threshold given by inequality (7).
Adaptive Dynamics

THE EVOLUTION OF x
We are interested in which starting move, or initial investment, is &&best'' for a given strategy. To determine this, we held k and d "xed and allowed x to evolve (Maynard Smith, 1982) , i.e. we start with an initial strategy S IBV and consider a small perturbation in the starting move,
, it is clear that S IBVY will invade and takeover a population of S IBV : we let x replace x and continue. The results of these simulations are shown in Fig. 3 . These surfaces plot the steady-state values of x (x ' ) when x is originally set to be 0 or 1 in the simulation. We note that x ' "1 is robust for a signi"cant fraction of the strategy space, and in particular we "nd a region of strategy space in which x evolves towards one, regardless of its initial value. This region appears in the upper corner (k is high) of strategy family M. The steady-state values of x for strategy families CONTINUOUS PRISONER'S DILEMMA FIG. 4. Examples of strategy evolution. Two examples of the evolution of a given starting strategy are shown; all three parameters of the starting strategy were allowed to evolve. Each panel plots the value of S(x) for 0)x)1; the circle on each graph shows the value of x for the strategy illustrated. Leftmost panels plot the starting strategies and subsequent panels show the strategy after 25 through 1000 successful mutations (indicated by the bold numbers above each column). We used b"2, c"1, and nN "20 for these simulations. In the "rst example, the simulation was seeded with a k"0. 51 We are particulary interested in the steadystate x value for the cooperative strategies, family P. We have found (refer to Appendix A) that for most strategies in this family, the surface shown in Fig. 3 is described by the equation
evolves from any initial value to the lowest x which elicits full cooperation in a single move (S(x ' )"1 for x ' " (1!d )/k). The best starting move for cooperators is not full cooperation but just enough to move the play to full cooperation in the next (and consequently every subsequent) move. Among cooperators, full cooperation is the best initial move (x ' "1) only for those strategies along the boundary of P and M (these strategies intersect the unit square at [1, 1] ).
We have also observed in some cases that when the initial value of x is below some critical value, it may reach a stable equilibrium in region P for intermediate values of
. This occurs when full cooperation is elicited not in the partner's "rst but in a subsequent move of the game, when for example S(S(x ' ))"(1!d )/k. For instance, in the "nite game with n moves with a starting x of zero, the evolution of x may halt when S(S(x ' ))"(1!d)/k because the cost of a further increase in x outweighs the bene"t; we can show that this situation occurs when the condition k!(b/c)k#1'0 is met (see Appendix A).
TRAJECTORIES THROUGH STRATEGY SPACE: THE EVOLUTION OF k, d AND x
We repeated these simulations, allowing k, d and x to vary simultaneously. For each strategy S IBV we considered strategies distributed in a sphere around that strategy, and accepted the parameter values of the strategy S with the highest payo! against S IBV , under the conditions that F
(S, S)'F(S, S) and F(S, S)'F(S, S)
(strategy S invades and takes over a population of S). Figure 4 illustrates two examples of such evolution through strategy space, where a given starting strategy has been followed for 1000 successful mutations. The circle on each graph shows the value of x for the strategy illustrated. In the "rst example, the simulation was seeded with a fairly uncooperative strategy, for which k"0. and were allowed to evolve through two successful mutations; all three parameters of the starting strategies were allowed to evolve. For this "gure we used b"2, c"1 and n"20, the results for nN "20 were qualitatively identical. The "gure illustrates the d}k plane at the level x "1. Open circles show the initial positions of the strategies investigated, and these are connected by solid lines to the "nal position of the strategy after two mutations. Crosses indicate strategies that are not invaded by their neighbors in strategy space. Where open circles appear without visible evolutionary trajectories in this plane, the trajectory is into the page; x evolves towards smaller values in these regions. For the majority of strategies within P and M, and for all strategies in N and N, strategies evolve towards the lower left boundary of the space, or towards indiscriminate defection. For sections of P and M where k is su$ciently large, however, strategies evolve towards the upper left; they become more cooperative and move towards the line k#d"1. o!ers full cooperation as an initial move, the strategy evolves initially to an even more cooperative state (dP1), but x gradually decreases, and eventually x , k and d all evolve to zero; the steady state is AllD.
These examples are illustrative of two broad classes of steady-state strategies that we observed: (i) cooperative strategies that intersect [1, 1] on the unit square and have fairly low intercepts; and (ii) indiscriminate defectors. To examine the evolutionary trajectories through strategy space more generally, we seeded strategies at uniform intervals in k, d and x , and followed the evolution of each strategy for a small number of mutations. Figure 5 shows one plane through the results of this simulation, the d}k plane at the level x "1. Open circles show the initial positions of the strategies investigated.
Lines indicate the direction of the evolution through strategy space. Where open circles appear without visible evolutionary trajectories in this plane, the trajectory is into the page; x evolves towards smaller values in regions P, P and N.
This "gure reveals a fairly complex set of trajectories on the x "1 plane. For the majority of strategies within P and M, and for all strategies in N and N, strategies evolve towards the lower left boundary of the space, or towards indiscriminate defection. For sections of P and M where k is su$ciently large, however, strategies evolve towards the upper left; they become more cooperative and move towards the line k#d"1.
The crosses in this "gure indicate strategies that are not invaded by their neighbors in strategy space. We are especially interested in the set of crosses which lies along the boundary between M and P, since these represent cooperative strategies which are stable with respect to the adaptive dynamics. For this set of strategies kx#d"1 when x"1; as in the "rst example of Fig. 4 , they intersect the unit square at [1, 1] .
Some insight into this set of strategies can be obtained analytically, particulary for the limiting case of an in"nite game. Consider a set of strategies on the d}k plane (at x "1) with the property that k#d"1. We denote one such strategy, S IBV , and a near neighbor S IYBYVY . If the neighbor is a member of M, then (as demonstrated previously) the play moves towards x"(kd#d )/ (1!kk) and x"k(kd#d )/(1!kk)#d. In the limit of an in"nitely repeated game, the mean payo! F(S IYBYVY , S IBV ) is equal to bx!cx. For S IBV to be invaded by its neighbor, we "nd
which, substituting, reduces to
under the conditions that k(1 and k#e(1, which are true for members of M.
CONTINUOUS PRISONER'S DILEMMA FIG. 6. Nash equilibria. Strategies were seeded at uniform intervals in k, d and x and were tested against 4125 other strategies in which !2)k)2, !1)d)2 and 0)x )1, using b"2 and c"1. Strategies which were apparently Nash equilibria (NE, conditions described in the text) are shown: NE with x "0 (;); Points which are NE with x "1 (*). There was no di!erence in these NE regions for games with exactly 20 rounds or games with 20 rounds on average. The star indicates a small region along the line segment +d"0; 0(k(1, in which strategies are apparently NE for a range of x values ( ). This NE region only exists for the game with a "xed number of rounds.
If the neighbor is a member of P, then it is clear that kx#d'1 and therefore the response of the neighbor to full cooperation will be full cooperation in return. Regardless of the initial moves, the play will move towards (1, 1); the two strategies are neutral with respect to each other.
Thus, we "nd analytically that none of the strategies on the boundary between M and P can be invaded by near neighbors in the in"-nite game, as long as k'c/b and x "1. The simulations illustrated in Fig. 5 indicate that this is also true for a "nite game. Note that this group of strategies is not only cooperative, but also lies along a line where x evolves towards 1. We also note that for this set of strategies in which d"1!k, the condition k'c/b is equivalent to the condition under which a cooperative strategy is resistant to invasion by AllD, that is,
Nash Equilibria
Using simulations with n"20 or nN "20, we found strategies which cannot apparently be beaten by any other strategy in our strategy space, i.e. strategies for which F(S, S)*F(S, S), ∀S. (This condition de"nes Nash equilibria, NE.) In these simulations, each strategy was tested against approximately 5000 other strategies which varied in k, d and x
. The results are illustrated in Figure (6 ). In this "gure, &&x'' represents NE with x "0, and &&o'' plots points which are NE with x "1. There was no di!erence in these NE regions for games with exactly 20 rounds or games with 20 rounds on average.
The star in Fig. 6 indicates a small region along the line segment +d"0; 0(k(1, in which strategies are NE over a range of x values. This NE region was only observed when the number of rounds was "xed, i.e. when payo!s occurring earlier in the game were not weighted more highly than later gains. We can show that for a small region along the line +d"0, near k"c/b, strategies are stable against invasion by both AllC and AllD for any value of x (Appendix B). Thus, we "nd that three groups of strategies are Nash equilibria in the Continuous Prisoner's Dilemma. A small set of strategies for which the intercept, d is zero and the slope is close to c/b are NE for a range of x values. AllD is a strategy at Nash equilibrium, as are strategies which are close to complete defection (in group P with su$ciently low slope and x "0). We further "nd that strategies which intersect the unit square at [1, 1] , with x "1 and an intercept which is less than 1!c/b, appear to be stable not only against near neighbors (as shown analytically in Section 3.2) but against any other strategy in the space. This group of strategies is of particular interest in the region c/b(k(1, where it de"nes a set of cooperative strategies which are Nash equilibria.
The three constellations of NE may be di!erentiated (as shown in Fig. 6 ) by the value of x in each group. Thus, given a "xed value of x , the most successful type of strategy in the system is determined. We "nd that for strategies which give nothing or very little as an initial move, all the NE are close to indiscriminate defection, and have very low mean payo!s (cf. Fig. 6 and Fig. 2 ). Conversely, for strategies which o!er complete cooperation as an initial move, some cooperative NE exist and these receive the maximum possible payo! when playing against themselves. We emphasize that all cooperative strategies which are NE share the feature that x "1.
Stochastic Adaptive Dynamics
Figure 5 suggests a fairly complex set of evolutionary trajectories through strategy space. To analyse the overall behavior of this system, we use a modi"cation of adaptive dynamics, in which a stochastic element is introduced to capture the e!ects of random drift. We begin with a single strategy, S, and allow it to evolve by small random changes in k, d or x to a new strategy S. We let S replace S if
F(S, S)'F(S, S)
and
This assumes that the frequency of advantageous mutations is low compared to the rate at which "xation occurs, and is the standard transition rule of adaptive dynamics (Nowak & Sigmund, 1990; Metz et al., 1996; Hofbauer & Sigmund, 1998) . To this standard rule we add the following three &&stochastic'' rules:
(1) Under the conditions
F(S, S))F(S, S),
we compute the equilibrium frequency of S, i.e. the frequency g such that
gF(S, S)#(1!g)F(S, S) "gF(S, S)#(1!g)F(S, S).
We then draw a random number from a uniform distribution on (0, 1) and accept S if this number is greater than g. This step is equivalent to the assumption that stochastic #uctuations will eventually cause the chance extinction of one of the two strategies which are at equilibrium in the population.
(2) Under the conditions
F(S, S)(F(S, S) (16) and F(S, S)'F(S, S),
we likewise compute the frequency, h, of strategy S that is necessary to overcome the invasion barrier. In this case we draw a random number, r, from (0, 1) and accept S in this case if r(e\HF. The exponent re#ects how likely it is that random drift will cause a #uctuation of frequency h in the population, and in reality will be related to the total population size, spatial structures or assortative interactions.
(3) If S and S are neutral with respect to each other, we assume that the chance that S disappears by chance extinction is inversely proportional to population size, N, and accept S if r(1/N.
Finally, we periodically introduce new mutants by choosing k, d and x from random distributions, rather than constraining S to be a near neighbor of S. These mutant strategies are then accepted or rejected according to the rules described above. Note that if S does not invade S, we rewrite S in the sequence of successful strategies, and generate a new S.
These transition rules allow us to &&explore'' the strategy space adaptively, by forming a discrete sequence of successful strategies. The introduction of randomly generated mutants gives this sequence the potential to span the entire strategy space, and from each new position in the space the natural adaptive trajectory is followed. In situations where this trajectory would reach a steady state according to standard adaptive dynamics, however, we allow the simulation to continue by invoking the stochastic rules (1)}(3) above. This allows the sequence to continue through regions of the space which are neutral with respect to each other, or to leave regions that are only subject to adaptive change after crossing an invasion barrier. We emphasize that these rules are called into play very infrequently in our simulations, accounting for only about 1}2% of all transitions. The weakest assumption of this method is that we do not allow equilibria to exist between di!erent strategies; this avoids the modelling of complicated polymorphisms.
CONTINUOUS PRISONER'S DILEMMA FIG. 7. Distribution of strategies determined by stochastic adaptive dynamics. A sequence of 100 000 successive strategies, with b"5, c"1 and an initial strategy I, was generated by stochastic adaptive dynamics. The distribution of these strategies is illustrated on the d}k plane (top panel). We show here the results for games of 20 rounds on average, but results for games with exactly 20 rounds were qualitatively and quantitatively similar. The plane was divided into pixels (width"height"0.02), and the number of strategies in each pixel was determined from the sequence. The results were mapped to a three-level grey scale and then smoothed by Gouraud shading. The results illustrate two clusters of successful strategies; one around d"0; k"0 or AllD, and a second cluster of cooperative strategies in the NE region along the boundary of M and P. The lower panel shows the same result but for b"2. Here we note more defective strategies in the distribution.
In the "nal adaptive sequence, the number of strategies which lie in each region of the space re#ects how &&successful'' strategies in that region are, or how unlikely it is for strategies of this type to be invaded or to drift to zero frequency. This feature allows us to use the "nal sequence to build a probability distribution in strategy space, re#ecting the success and overall robustness of every type of strategy.
Using this method, we simulated the long-term evolution of the system, starting with strategy I and producing 100 000 new strategies successively. Each strategy played a single 20 round game against each putative successor, with b"5 and c"1. We also simulated the case when nN "20 by weighting the payo! in round i by the probability that a game would last to round i, (1!1/nN )G\. We set "2 in all of these simulations.
We found that along this trajectory of adaptive dynamics, only about 2% of newly generated strategies were accepted by overcoming an invasion barrier, about 1.5% by chance extinction of one of two strategies in equilibrium, and less than 0.1% by chance extinction of one of two neutral strategies. One in every ten new strategies was generated as a random, non-neighboring mutant, and such mutants successfully invaded about 3% of the time.
The results of this simulation are illustrated in Fig. 7 . This "gure shows the distribution, over the d}k plane, of 100 000 successive strategies, with b"5, c"1. The "gure illustrates that strategies in this sequence are distributed throughout all strategy families, but that clusters of successful strategies occur predominantly in two regions of the d}k plane: we see a cluster of strategies near [0, 0] and along the boundary of the region corresponding to AllD (for example along the line d"0, k(0); we also observe a cluster of cooperative strategies in the Nash equilibria region along the boundary of M and P.
About 19% of these strategies were members of family P, the cooperators, and fully 41% were close to full cooperation, in the sense that F(S, S) was within 10% of the maximum payo! possible between identical strategies. Of the members of P, 35% occurred at the region of NE on the boundary between P and M (i.e. they met the conditions k (!d#1.1 and k'c/b) . About 18% of successful strategies were members of family P, the defectors.
FIG. 8. Evolution of F(S, S), x
, k and d for 2500 successive strategies. The value of the payo! function and the three parameters of the strategy are shown, for a typical segment of 2500 strategies from the stochastic adaptive sequence described for Fig. 7 ; for the sequence shown here b"2. The payo! illustrated is the payo! recieved when the strategy plays itself, F(S, S), and is highly correlated to x .
We repeated this simulation with b"2, and found only 7% cooperators, and 35% defectors [ Fig. 7(b) ]. This illustrates the sensitivity of this distribution in strategy space to the cost-tobene"t ratio. Figure 8 shows the evolution of F(S, S), x , k and d over a subset of successive strategies, for the initial simulation with b"2. Note the striking correlation between the payo! and x . For 100 000 strategies, the correlation coe$cient between F(S, S) and x was 0.86 (compared to !0.02 and 0.02 for k and d, respectively).
Discussion
By simulating the evolutionary dynamics of interspeci"c mutualisms, Doebeli and Knowlton (1998) found that the initial o!ers of both host and symbiont evolve towards zero unless spatial e!ects are included in the model (but see Killingback et al., 1999) . We concur that many strategies in our strategy space evolve towards total defection, but have found some notable exceptions to this trend. In particular, strategies that respond sensitively to cooperation (k su$ciently high), but are not suckers (d su$ciently low), have the potential to evolve towards cooperative Nash equilibria.
These Nash equilibria are a set of cooperative strategies which receive the maximum payo! when playing against themselves, and yet are neither susceptible to invasion by defectors nor by more generous strategies. We note three de"ning characteristics of these We also "nd that all the cooperative NE strategies make the highest initial o!er possible, x "1. When faced with a new opponent, these strategies o!er complete cooperation*they are consistently optimistic. If the opponent defects, however, these strategies immediately respond with a very low second move [S(0)"d(1!c/b], and continue attempts to raise the stakes gradually. The initial optimism is important because it allows cooperative strategies to get on with cooperating, without the lengthy business of building up trust. All else being equal, these strategies assume the best of everyone. 3. Finally, we note that the most successful strategies in the continuous Prisoner's Dilemma are uncompromising. By this we mean that these players o!er full cooperation as a "rst move but thereafter do not cooperate fully unless their opponent does the same: x "1 and S(1)"1, but S(x)(1 for all x(1. This feature is crucial because it ensures that these strategies cannot be exploited by players who consistently undercut full cooperation. Roberts and Sherratt (1998) found that a low initial investment, followed by gradual increases, was a particularly e!ective strategy in their continuous model of the Prisoner's Dilemma. A direct comparison with our results is di$cult, because the strategies used by Roberts and Sherratt are formulated di!erently. We note that the cooperative Nash equilibria in our model do attempt to raise the stakes when playing a strategy which is initially reticent to cooperate, since S(x)'x for all x. Our NE strategies, however, o!er full cooperation as an initial move. Cooperative strategies which o!er anything less than complete cooperation as a starting move are not Nash equilibria in our model, but can be invaded by strategies with a higher initial o!er; this appears to be the case in the formulation of Roberts and Sherratt as well.
In summary we "nd that the initial o!er, x , is a decisive factor in the Continuous Prisoner's Dilemma. The steady-state regions in this system can be distinguished by x , the mean payo! a population of a given strategy receives is tightly coupled to x , and x evolves towards an o!er which will elicit complete cooperation in a partner, whenever that is possible.
We have introduced an extension of standard adaptive dynamics which models the e!ects of random #uctuations in population frequencies. We use two &stochastic' transition rules to model random drift in populations which are either at equilibrium or neutral with respect to each other, while a third rule models the possible #uctuation of population frequency past an invasion barrier. Although these stochastic transitions are actually very infrequent in our simulations, this approach (coupled with the introduction of randomly generated mutant strategies) allows adaptive change to continue through every region of the strategy space. We avoid modelling complicated polymorphisms by disallowing equilibrium states between di!erent strategies; our results are therefore an approximation of population dynamics which may be more complex.
In the resulting sequence of successful strategies, the number of strategies in each region of the space re#ects the overall success of strategies in that region. For example, the number of time steps for which a given strategy remains successful against putative invaders re#ects the probability that this strategy will neither be invaded nor drift to zero frequency. The "nal sequence of strategies therefore represents a probability distribution in strategy space, allowing us to visualize the overall success and robustness of every type of strategy. We "nd that this distribution is extremely sensitive to the cost-to-bene"t ratio. When the bene"ts of cooperation are su$ciently high, cooperators will outnumber defectors.
